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Not Taking Rights Seriously: Hallmarks of the
Frivolous Human Rights “Critique”
Ann Elizabeth Mayer

Introduction
My interest in clashing views on the relationship of
Islam and human rights came about as a result of unplanned
encounters in Sudan. When I went to Sudan to conduct
research on Islamization of the economy in 1984-85, I had
no idea that discussions with Sudanese lawyers and human
rights activists were about to change the course of my
research. Discussions both during Nimeiri’s Islamization
program and following his overthrow exposed me to the
nefarious impact that Islamization as conceived by a
thuggish dictator could have on human rights. In large
measure, the Sudanese whom I encountered regarded Nimeiri’s
version of Islamic law as a perversion of Islam, believing
that Islam, correctly understood, supported their
aspirations to enjoy the human rights set forth in
international law. I was impressed that courageous
opponents of Nimeiri’s Islamization were ready to risk
their own lives to speak out to denounce the resulting
injustices. One of the bravest was Mahmud Muhammad Taha, an
Islamic reformer, whom Nimeiri executed shortly after my
first trip to Khartoum, officially consigning him to death
for “apostasy” but in reality retaliating for his bold
condemnation of the human rights abuses being perpetrated
in the guise of applying Islamic law. Widespread outrage
over the judicial murder of Taha was one of the factors
mobilizing the populace to revolt and overthrow Nimeiri in
1985. Having confronted the gap between popular support for
human rights and a dictator’s campaign to crush a restive
citizenry under the rubric of applying Islamic law, I
wanted to share what I had learned with others.
I made an initial effort to explain the Sudanese human
rights situation and how it confirmed the premises of human
rights universalism in a 1986 talk criticizing Nimeiri’s
Islamization program at one of the major U.S. centers of
Middle Eastern studies. I amplified the discussion by
comparisons with developments in other Middle Eastern
countries. I also critiqued the diluted rights set forth in
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. I
called for differentiating Muslims’ religious beliefs from
the political uses of Islam to rationalize oppression.

I encountered incomprehension and hostility from the
U.S. audience, most of whose members were convinced that
criticizing a military dictator who claimed to be
implementing Islamic law necessarily reflected attitudes
that were Orientalist, neo-Imperialist, and disrespectful
of the Islamic religion. Exacerbating the hostile reactions
was the fact that my approach violated the canons of
cultural relativism, then treated by most U.S. academics
concerned with the Middle East as unimpeachable dogma. (The
hold of cultural relativism has since then somewhat
weakened.) As applied to human rights issues, proponents of
cultural relativism classified international human rights
law as an artifact of Western culture -- with the
consequence that its application to Muslim societies
involved judging them by inappropriate, alien criteria.
There was also an understandable tendency to refer
back to the history of Imperialist incursions in the Middle
East, in which complaints about the oppression of local
rulers could be opportunistically invoked as a pretext to
legitimize European invasions. Thus, the ideal of human
rights universalism was being reflexively – and incorrectly
-- associated with the old Western colonialist project and
a mentality that saw Western domination of Muslim societies
as both natural and beneficial. Since international law was
assumed to be infected by a Western hegemonic ideology – a
highly dubious assumption about a law that harshly and
unequivocally condemns colonialism and that sanctifies the
right of self-determination, any Westerner like myself who
called for applying it in Muslim countries was imagined to
be furthering neo-imperialist designs.
Furthermore, in the reactions of the audience members,
one could perceive the influence of the binary vision of
“the West” versus “the Orient” that is so typical of
Orientalism, without their being conscious that treating
these as oppositional pairs was tied to their own
Orientalist tendencies. They were ready to hurl
“Orientalist” as an epithet to denigrate those making
negative assessments of the human rights situations in
Muslim countries, regardless of the quality and accuracy of
the assessments. At the same time, those accusing me of
Orientalism were themselves caught in Orientalist
stereotyping, imagining that “the natives” should not be
covered by standards aimed at ensuring justice and equality
– thereby aligning themselves with the colonialist
mentality that likewise denied “the natives” justice and
equality. The eminent Syrian philosopher Sadiq al-`Azm has
decried the Orientalism inhering in such attitudes, in

which Westerners imagine that Muslims cannot appreciate
democratic freedoms and human rights, presuming that, as
Muslims, they must be “eternally sealed within their own
cultural totalities and/or permanently condemned to live
lives within the confines of their ‘most authentic’ systems
of beliefs and values.”1
In any event, support for human rights universalism
was confused with the Orientalist mentality dissected by
Edward Said, without people taking into account the fact
that Said himself was a human rights universalist who
appreciated the emancipatory potential of human rights. The
possibility of differentiating the cynical appropriation of
human rights rhetoric for neo-Imperialist designs and the
principled struggles of human rights activists to end
oppression was not conceded, and the capacity of peoples
around the globe to collaborate on the basis of their
shared concern for the wellbeing of humanity was ruled out
in advance.
I noticed that not one of my critics could go beyond
uninformed preconceptions and charges; none of them spoke
on the basis of personal experience investigating human
rights issues in Muslim countries, and none could explain
with specific examples and logical reasoning why it was
appropriate to strip people in Muslim countries of the
human rights that they aspired to enjoy. A lack of
familiarity with the U.N. human rights system was much in
evidence in the comments made. Not realizing how U.N. human
rights documents were constructed with input from countries
around the world or how estranged the United States was
from the international human rights system, these academics
imagined that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and other instruments embodied distinctive U.S.
values and priorities. Based on their preconceptions, they
could not accept the fact that Middle Eastern Muslims
figured among the more important contributors to
formulating the International Bill of Human Rights.2
1

Sadik [sic] al-`Azm, “The Importance of Being Earnest
About Salman Rushdie,” Die Welt des Islams, vol. 31 (1991),
30-34.
2

A recent study of Muslim input into the UN human rights
principles has made an important contribution to expanding
awareness of the debt that U.N. human rights system owes to
delegates from Muslim countries. See Susan Waltz,
“Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim
States,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26 (2004), 799-844.

Since I did have background in international law and
since I was talking about what I had actually witnessed in
Khartoum and was reflecting discussions with knowledgeable
Sudanese, I was confident that my perspectives were on firm
ground. I felt moved to correct the misapprehensions that
stood in the way of grasping the politics of human rights
in Muslim countries. I committed myself to what I
originally assumed would be a short-term project of
explaining the implications of the arguments that Muslims
necessarily stood outside the international human rights
system and that their rights had to be set according to
distinctive “Islamic” standards. I sought to encourage
people to examine more critically the political uses of
Islam to justify oppression. I aimed to draw attention to
how Muslims supportive of human rights found congruity
between Islamic values and the principles of international
law, believing that as Muslims they did not have to choose
between their religion and human rights.
I realized that I needed to counter the tendency to
treat Islam as a monolith. I had to explain how Muslims’
wildly differing stances on whether Islam constituted an
obstacle to human rights might reflect a variety of
competing strains in Islamic thought and how they often
tied in directly with local politics. Using examples from
official statements and actual human rights records, I
sought to demonstrate how in cases where Islam was
controlled by governments, the official “Islams” had to be
understood as expressions of state policy, not as
expressions of immutable Islamic doctrine. Feeling that
people too often overlooked the central role of the nationstate, a Western model of government adopted by all Muslim
countries, I stressed that national politics – not Islamic
culture -- lay behind state sponsored deviations from
international human rights law. All this meant that the
cultural relativists’ conviction that attacking
governmental rights policies was the same thing as
attacking Islamic culture was misguided.
Although my own research has concentrated on the
politics of human rights in the Middle East, because of my
interest in how local particularisms are invoked to resist
international law, I have extended my work to critique U.S.
policies affecting international human rights law, which
leave the United States deeply estranged from the

international system. U.S. official views on many human
rights issues exhibit the same insistence on the
proposition that local law overrides international human
rights law that one finds in many Muslim countries, and
certain U.S. policies are becoming increasingly aligned
with those of Muslim countries.3
Knowing that my work was in a controversial area, I
tried to make sure that it was based on a firm foundation
of careful investigation and analysis. I sought to learn as
much as I could about all sides of the issues I was
covering, doing extensive research in a wide variety of
relevant sources. I did not allow my initial preconceptions
to dictate my conclusions; I second guessed my own
assumptions as I expanded my knowledge of the subjects that
I was researching. (I had already shown my readiness to
rethink my positions when, after discussions in Khartoum, I
myself corrected some cultural relativist misconceptions
that I had initially harbored.) I exerted myself to provide
in depth and fully documented scholarly assessments and
comparisons of the ways that governments, politicians and
diplomats, ideologues, lawyers, religious leaders and
institutions, intellectuals, and academics had addressed
the significance of Islam in relation to human rights
issues. Recognizing that people tended to make casual
generalizations about human rights without actually
studying carefully the applicable provisions of
international human rights instruments, I decided to remedy
this by including detailed examinations and comparisons of
international human rights provisions with the
significantly altered versions offered in so-called Islamic
human rights schemes.
Distinctions between the Islamic tradition and the way
it is reworked by the modern nation state for its political
objectives are essential to understanding my work on Islam
and human rights. The modern nation state is now
ubiquitous in the Middle East, and it has had great impact
on the way laws ostensibly derived from Islam are
3

See the publications listed below in note 35-37 and the
forthcoming chapter on how the second Bush administration
has allied itself with Muslim countries in fighting human
rights dealing with children, women, and sexuality -- Ann
Elizabeth Mayer “The Internationalization of Religiously
Based Resistance to International Human Rights Law,” to be
published in a volume entitled Global Justice and the
Bulwarks of Localism: Human Rights in Context.

formulated. My analyses of human rights issues build on my
earlier studies assessing state-sponsored Islamization
programs, concluding that they produced selective and
highly politicized versions of Islamic principles. As I
compared various Islamization programs, I noted a pattern
of the vast and complex Islamic jurisprudential heritage
becoming winnowed into a few principles reflecting the
agendas of ruling elites.4 I found that the results of
state-sponsored Islamization programs were more a function
of politics than the revival of Islamic tradition. How
Islam is being used as a governmental rationale for human
rights violations similarly turns out to be a function of
state-centric politics.5 This political dimension of my
assessments and my focus on state policy – easily
distinguishable from the Islamic tradition per se -- are
regularly ignored by polemicists who are determined to
depoliticize the way Islam is deployed to serve the agendas
of those in control of the state.
My objective was to make my philosophical orientation
in support of human rights transparent, the steps in my
reasoning carefully outlined, and my documentation
comprehensive. (On this last, have sometimes been thwarted
by editors who insist on cutting out many of my examples
and quotations and require me to excise most footnotes,
finding the scope of my documentation excessive.) My hope
was that, regardless of whether readers decided to agree
4

See e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Libyan Legislation in
Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual Mores,” The American
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 1980),
287-313; “Islam and the State,” Cardozo Law Review, vol.
12, nos. 3-4 (1991), 1015-56; "The Shari`a: A Methodology
or a Body of Substantive Rules?" in Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence, Nicholas Heer, ed.(Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1990), 177-198; “The Fundamentalist
Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran,
Pakistan and the Sudan,” in Fundamentalism and the State:
Remaking Polities, Economics, and Militance, Martin Marty
and Scott Appleby, eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 110-51.
5
See e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Shifting Grounds for
Challenging the Authority of International Human Rights
Law: Religion as a Malleable and Politicized Pretext for
Governmental Noncompliance with Human Rights,” in Human
Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism, Andras
Sajo, ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 349-74.

with my final conclusions, they could trust my expositions
and not worry about being misled by the kinds of
disinformation that one finds in shoddy or tendentious
accounts masquerading as scholarship.
My perspective was, as I frankly acknowledged, that of
a supporter of the international standards and a member of
groups committed to the proposition that human rights must
be universally applied and respected. I know that this
means that some will object that, in consequence, I cannot
claim the objectivity that they think is called for. In my
defense, I can say that, since I have been candid about my
belief in human rights universality, if there is a bias, it
should be one that readers can readily take into account.
Moreover, there are problems with insisting that scholars
should be neutral on sensitive contemporary human rights
issues. Should we really demand that, as a precondition for
writing about human rights, people be neutral on issues
like torture of detainees, massacres of innocent civilians,
harsh persecutions of dissidents, or laws treating adult
women as children subject to male chastisement? Do people
perform better as scholars in the human rights domain if
they lack consciences or if they have no empathy for the
plight of the oppressed? I think that for human rights
scholarship to be valuable, it need not eschew a point of
view on contested issues; what it should do is to try to
provide valid insights into problems that come from
thorough research, sound methods, and thoughtful analysis.
In any event, I was pleased over the years to see some
of the scholars who had been my harshest critics at that
initial 1986 talk subsequently change opinions and become
strong supporters of human rights for people in the Muslim
world. Alas, I was later to encounter a whole new phalanx
of critics in the form of polemicists who were prepared to
deploy any tactics, regardless of how dishonest and
unsavory these might be, in their efforts to discredit any
analyses that supported human rights universalism and
discredited policies of Islamic exceptionalism.

Characteristics of frivolous and polemical human rights
critiques
Those of us who dedicate ourselves to producing
serious scholarship on human rights issues in Muslim
societies have every reason to want to be meticulous. When
we see peoples’ welfare and even their survival

jeopardized, we feel a powerful incentive to work hard to
ensure that our assessments can stand up to critical
scrutiny. Since we inevitably confront hostile forces that
are determined to discredit our analyses, we struggle to
ensure their soundness -- in the hope that, over time, our
careful work will lead to our analyses being given proper
weight. Our task grows harder with the emergence of a
contingent of polemicists determined to muddle analyses of
human rights by disseminating frivolous, pseudo-scholarly
“critiques,” misrepresenting the nature of the issues in
the controversies about Islam and human rights and
misleading readers about the character of the secondary
literature. Like email spam clogging one’s in boxes, this
pseudo-scholarship takes up a great deal of space and
creates the need for people to devote time to the
evaluations needed to distinguish what is valuable from
what is spam.
The people characterized here as polemicists are not
scholars who engage in the normal disputation about real
controversies and who criticize publications based on their
problematic contents, which would be entirely legitimate.
One expects and should welcome criticisms that expose flaws
and problems and that can lead to improvements and advances
in knowledge. However, no benefit whatsoever comes from
“critiques” launched by persons who merely hope to score
political points with certain constituencies by
irresponsibly making accusations that they know are
unfounded. (I am assuming those being designated as
polemicists are not so dim, so confused that they cannot
actually distinguish accurate statements from ones having
no basis in fact.) Certain polemicists are so addicted to
launching aggressive attacks that they invent battles based
on utterly specious pretexts. In their modus operandi,
they are much like the second Bush Administration, which
attacked and invaded Iraq on the completely spurious
pretext that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction
that it was about to use, repeating this lie many times in
many forums, heedless of its falsehood. Obviously,
President George W. Bush and the neo-con contingent calling
for military aggression were eager to attack Iraq for other
reasons, but the supposed threat posed by Saddam’s WMDs was
relied on as the official rationale. In much the same way,
the polemicists’ attacks on my human rights scholarship do
not relate to what I have ever written or said, but rest
instead on the basis of allegations as far-fetched as the
official U.S. charges that Saddam harbored WMDs.

Understanding the relationship between Islam and human
rights is an important topic, but the prospects for such
understanding are set back when polemicists insist on
operating on their own rigid, ill-founded preconceptions
and stubbornly refuse to adjust their thinking on the basis
of evidence showing their deficiencies. Unsettled by
propositions that challenge their often naïve stereotypes,
they deploy distortions, counterfactual assertions, and
base insinuations to discredit scholarship that cannot be
squeezed into their intellectual procrustean beds. Unable
to produce reasoned analyses, they resort to unfounded
accusations and distortions – or even to outright lies – in
order to “prove” their points. The “critiques” coming from
such polemical ventures may masquerade as human rights
scholarship, but they represent its antithesis. Since
these polemicists rely on spurious pretexts for taking the
offensive, their “critiques” are obviously motivated by
reasons other than the advancement of knowledge. Since I do
take the advancement of knowledge to be the whole purpose
of scholarship, I think it worth spending some time to cast
light on their tactics.
In the areas that I write on, I observe that the
hostility of polemicists tends to be provoked by analyses
that pass negative judgments on the human rights deficits
in Muslim societies, using international human rights law
to judge these. Such analyses are categorized – wrongly -as the misuse of quintessentially Western standards to
denigrate Islamic culture. Criticism coming from a nonMuslim in the West will be said to involve using
inappropriate Western standards to judge Muslim societies;
if coming from a Muslim, criticism will be dismissed as a
manifestation of cultural alienation or the author’s
mindless aping of Western attitudes. Thus, I have had to
become accustomed to being slurred by polemicists, who
insist that my calling for protecting Muslims’ human rights
means I am using Western standards to cast aspersions on
Islam and am engaging in a blameworthy attempt to establish
Western superiority.
A classic example of this kind of polemical attack can
be seen in a supposed “critique” of my work authored by one
Shamsheer Ali, which is replete with false accusations. As
with most other such pseudo-scholarly “critiques” of my
publications, Ali’s is studded with footnotes in hopes that
readers will believe that it has documentary support. In

reality, the footnotes are specious, mere decorative
elements adorning a tirade lacking any research basis.6
Alas, he has many emulators.

The Significance of the Assault on Human Rights
Universalism

In some milieus attacking human rights universalism
offers a respectable way for pressing opinions that, upon
inspection, turn out to be reactionary. Where women’s
international human rights are concerned, polemicists
opposed to allowing Muslim women equality in rights have a
field day. Unwilling to make candid acknowledgments of
their own hostility towards women’s equality in rights,
they re-imagine Muslim societies as feminism-free zones -as if being Muslim was tantamount to having an abhorrence
of feminism. They refuse to acknowledge the voices of the
growing contingent of Muslim feminists, who have
outspokenly and courageously fought for equality. They lump
Muslim women together, treating them as a species of
subhumans united in their willingness to being denied basic
freedoms, all in the guise of fidelity to “Islam.” A
mindset that treasures preserving an Islamic identity over
all other values and a natural hostility to the supposedly
alien “Western” values of human rights are imputed to all
Muslim women – except, of course, for those women deemed to
be cultural traitors.

6

See Shamsheer Ali, “Review Article: Misguided Theorizing
and Application,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol.
19, no. 2 (1999), 299-320. Among other things, Ali accuses
me of extolling secular liberal culture as being superior
to other cultures (p. 300) when I make no claims whatsoever
about any such cultural superiority, of being “boastful
that human rights are a unique product of Western
liberalism”(p. 301) — citing to a publication where no such
claim is being made, and of treating human rights law as
practiced in U.S. courts as normative(p. 313) – when U.S.
courts fail to apply international human rights law, a
failing that I have repeatedly deplored. I was afforded an
opportunity to respond in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Misguided
Interpretation: Ann Elizabeth Mayer’s Response to Shamsheer
Ali’s Review Article,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
vol. 20 (2000), 181-84.

Among supporters of the Islamist project one finds
ideologues who combine elements of Marxism, traditionally
hostile to civil and political rights, with Islamist
apologetics. In a quixotic decision, the feminist journal
SIGNS, which would hardly publish an article by a Christian
fundamentalist like James Dobson demanding that U.S.
women’s rights be determined by Biblical standards, felt
comfortable publishing an article by Anouar Majid, who
calls for Muslim women to defer to Islamic tradition and
who portrays Iran’s Islamization program in the most
favorable light.7
As part of his support for Islamist strictures affecting
women, Majid denounces women’s international human rights
as a Western imperialist plot that can have no legitimacy
in Muslim societies, linking this to his condemnation of
the predations of global capitalism. Denying the legitimacy
of concerns for setbacks to women’s rights under Iran’s
Islamization program, which he sees as having “liberated”
Iranian women, Majid scoffs at concerns for women’s human
rights as “a new form of orientalism” that equates “reIslamization” with a retreat “into a medieval
obscurantism.”8 He speaks of a failure to chronicle the
“female affirmation” by Islamist groups such as the Muslim
Brothers, suggesting that this is the fault of “dominating
currents of Western feminism,” “orientalist legacies,” and
liberal bourgeois values such as “a deshistoricized notion
of human rights and an implicit acceptance of the bourgeois
political apparatus as a reliable mechanism for negotiating
the grievances of the exploited.”9 The actual records of
discriminatory treatment of women after “re-Islamization”
in countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan are
conveniently ignored.
Although indicating his negative assessment of my
positions on human rights, Majid is more offended by the
idea that a Muslim woman would dare appeal to international
human rights law. Having noted that the prominent Moroccan
feminist Fatima Mernissi is a strong supporter of women’s
human rights, Majid admonishes her that a feminist movement
that calls for civil rights “in the Islamic world today
dismisses the weight of tradition and culture,” and he also
faults it for discouraging resistance to Westernization.10
7

See Anouar Majid,“The Politics of Feminism in Islam,”
SIGNS, vol. 23 (Winter 1998), 321-61.
8
Ibid., 340.
9
Ibid., 339.
10
Ibid., 345.

That is, a feminist like Mernissi, a Muslim woman raised in
a traditional Moroccan harem environment, who rebels
against what supporters of patriarchy claim are sacred
rules requiring women’s submission, is no more than an
agent of Western influence. Unlike the doctrines fashioned
by male interpreters who preach women’s duty to defer to
discriminatory rules – something that Majid implicitly
accepts as truly Islamic, Majid does not bother to examine
Mernissi’s enlightened feminist readings of Islamic
requirements, these being effectively dismissed as mere
kowtowing to Western ideas.
Deploying Marxist concepts in his attempts to defend
Iran’s reactionary policies on women, Majid associates
Iran’s rules enforcing Islamic dress for women with the
struggle against Westernization and the global neocolonial
order. That is, as Majid portrays it, the regime’s policies
of stripping women of rights is not a case of reactionary
clerics imposing hejab as part of a regime of stripping
women of rights and freedoms; the hejab is a weapon in the
struggle against global capitalism. He does not try to
explain how Iranian women wearing chadors would keep global
capitalism at bay when the same clerics who impose such
dress on women are fighting determinedly to gain Iran’s
entrée into the WTO, the centerpiece of the global
capitalist system.
I have critiqued Majid’s attempts to make his
endorsement of reactionary Islamist policies on women seem
to be animated by progressive concerns, pointing out among
other things how he ignores the manifestations of hunger
for human rights among the populations of Muslim countries,
how he writes around and suppresses the negative
implications of Islamist policies affecting women, and how
his insistence that women must defer any claims for human
rights until the achievement of self-determination for
“peoples” at some uncertain future date means that women
are being consigned to having their aspirations for
equality endlessly deferred.11
11

See Ann Elizabeth Mayer,“Comment on Majid’s ‘The Politics
of Feminism in Islam’,” SIGNS, vol. 23 (Winter 1998), 36977. Regrettably, my response was written to an earlier
draft of his article than the one actually appearing in
print. At the last minute, an altered version of Majid’s
original article was inserted, allowing him to tone down
his effusions of enthusiasm for Islamism and Iran’s Islamic
Revolution In consequence of the last minute alterations
and the shortness of the time I had to rewrite, my page

The Iranian human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi
represents the kind of Muslim woman who – according to the
world views of people like Majid -- should not exist.
Ebadi, a believing Muslim and a feminist, is an outspoken
critic of U.S. policies at the same time that she condemns
Iran’s discriminatory treatment of women. She is a perfect
exemplar of how Muslims in Muslim countries can insist that
Islam is consonant with human rights, rejecting the
policies stripping their fellow Muslims of human rights
because they do not accept that Islam requires deviating
from international human rights. Thus, Ebadi has fought
hard to roll back the discriminatory laws affecting women
that Iran’s clerical rulers insist are mandated by Islamic
requirements. These included laws that removed Ebadi from
her judgeship on the grounds of sex-stereotyping that
proposed that all women were unfit for holding judicial
office. Barring women from all judicial offices embodies
the kind of blatantly sexist and reactionary views that
polemicists like Majid prefer not to discuss in their
attempts to rehabilitate the image of Iran’s ruling
theocracy.
Ebadi’s case proves that human rights universality is
a two-edged sword; it can be used to critique human rights
violations whether they occur in East or West under an
Islamic rubric or in Western countries. Ebadi dislikes
wearing the “Islamic” uniform imposed by Iran’s ruling
clerics and dresses in Western style when she leaves Iran.
Thus, she was bare-headed when she received the news of her
Nobel Prize in Paris in October 2003 and also when she went
to Oslo in December for the Nobel Prize ceremony. However,
as a true supporter of human rights universality, Ebadi did
not limit herself to fighting against Iran’s discriminatory
treatment of women, like its coercive official Islamic
dress rules. Having a mastery of international human
rights law and following a coherent universalist model of
human rights, Ebadi used her time in the spotlight to
insist that women should be free to choose whether or not
to cover their hair – and that this principle applied not
only in Iran but in Europe, as well. During her October
stay in Paris, Ebadi noted the debates on the French plan
to ban Muslim students from wearing headscarves in schools.
Believing in freedom of religion as a principle that
crosses national frontiers, Ebadi sided with the Muslim
women who protested the ban on headscarves in French
references and quotations do not always correlate with the
altered text.

schools, asserting that she was equally opposed to the
French ban on the headscarf and to the Iranian imposition
of the headscarf, that both were unacceptable from a human
rights perspective.12 It is cases like hers that
demonstrate how believing Muslims who are versed in
international human rights law do appreciate the need to
have consistent standards and and how they press
universalist positions that will be anathema to those
preaching the doctrine that human rights are “too Western”
and “too secular” for Muslims.

Discussing Human Rights in an Era of Islamophobia
Given the current international situation, there is a
great deal of ambient “noise” that interferes with
successful communication on issues of Islam and human
rights. It is vital to distinguish well-documented and fair
criticisms that reflect rigorous and consistent
applications of international standards from a very
different phenomenon -- the selective appropriation of
human rights by Western governments to justify their
political and economic encroachments or the cynical
deployment of human rights rhetoric by Islamophobes. The
motives behind scholarship that endeavors to render
intelligible complex developments in Middle Eastern
societies can be confused with the motives of actors in the
drama of expanding U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. U.S.
ambitions to impose a Pax Americana on the Middle East have
mushroomed since September 11, 2001, raising the “noise”
level, which was already confusing for many observers.
Today one sees Western politicians -- like members of the
second Bush administration -- who cynically exploit human
rights as a tool to bludgeon uncooperative countries into
submission or to justify neo-imperialist crusades. The
blatant double standards of the Bush Administration, in
which a country like Iran is demonized and more cooperative
or subservient countries that are human rights hells -like Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan -are treated leniently, naturally provoke disgust.
Those perceiving the outlines of a neo-colonialist plot
in efforts to secure the universality of human rights might
12

See e.g., Pierre-Henry Deshayes, “Laurels but no head
scarf: Shirin Ebadi in Oslo to receive Nobel Peace Prize,”
Agence France Presse, Dec. 8, 2003.

point to statements like those made on September 26, 2001,
by Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi, a strong supporter of
U.S. intervention in the Middle East. This neo-fascist
official proclaimed Western civilization superior to that
of Islam – in part based on the West’s advances in human
rights – and called for the West to “occidentalize” the
globe, as if this would be to the benefit of non-Western
societies. Among his comments were:
We should be confident of the superiority of our
civilization, which consists of a value system that has
given people widespread prosperity in those countries that
embrace it, and guarantees respect for human rights and
religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic
countries.13
However, the neo-fascist Berlusconi has no stature
whatsoever in the human rights domain, and his enthusiasm
for Western Imperialist ventures in Muslim countries is
irreconcilable with fundamental principles of international
law supporting self-determination and anti-colonialism.
Wrongly assuming that ideas like Berlusconi’s are typical
of human rights activists, persons skeptical about claims
of human rights universality may envisage a grim outcome of
the struggle on behalf of human rights universality and may
project that, when non-Western societies lie prostrate
after being overwhelmed by the ravages of Western culture,
they will be incapable of resisting Western economic and
military predations. In reality, it is the lack of human
rights that, in combination with other factors, makes so
many Muslim countries particularly vulnerable to outside
pressures.
More “noise” is engendered by Western religious
leaders like Franklin Graham and political pundits like Ann
Coulter who demonize Islam and call for Muslims to be
converted to Christianity, assuming that Islamic
civilization is barbaric and backward. One also encounters
journalistic proponents of rank Islamophobia, like the
Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, who authors poisonous
diatribes against Muslims and their faith. To their “noise”
is added the babbling of supposed “experts” on Islam like
the pseudonymous “Ibn Warraq” who is furiously hostile to
13
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Islam and who wages campaigns to defame it, blaming Islam
for the ills of Muslim societies – including the dismal
human rights situations that one finds there.14 I need not
dwell on my quarrels with “Ibn Warraq,” since the person
hiding behind this pseudonym has given the world ample
reason to question his evaluative capacities via his
writings, most particularly his recent assault on the
deceased Edward Said, whom he accuses of being “the most
influential exponent” of the philosophical trend that
produced “Islamic terrorism.” 15 In an interesting twist,
the Islamophobic “Ibn Warraq” attacks me, expressing
disgust at what he calls my “desperate attempts to
exonerate Islam.”16 That is, while polemicists with
apologetic and cultural relativist agendas condemn me for
negative characterizations of Islam, a polemicist on the
opposite side who is aiming to denigrate Islam finds the
distinctions that I draw between Islam and the political
uses of Islam objectionable.
Such background “noise” frequently disposes people to
make too casually the assumption that all critical
appraisals by Westerners of human rights deficits in Muslim
societies must be animated by hostility towards Islam
14
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and/or by support for the designs of Western neoimperialism. It is vital to differentiate well-founded
critical evaluations of the ideologized Islam that is
deployed both by governments and by reactionary Islamists
as the pretext for oppression from a different phenomenon,
Islamophobia – attacks on Islam per se and diatribes
designed to establish that Islamic civilization is
defective and barbaric in comparison with its Western
counterpart. The latter approach entails denigrating
Islamic religion and culture on the basis of hostile
stereotyping and ethnocentric presumptions of Western
superiority, whereas the former condemns specific political
programs for their non-conformity with international law,
using standards that likewise apply to judge Western
shortcomings. Without the right distinctions, discussions
of human rights issues in Muslim countries become
hopelessly confused, with non-issues becoming elevated to
the status of the issues, diverting attention from human
rights problems that cry out for attention.

A Human Rights Critique out of Lewis Carroll’s World
The following dissection of John Strawson’s grossly
misleading “critique” of my work should serve as an
instructive illustration of how what I write is traduced by
people who are committed to discrediting scholarship that
conflicts with their convictions that human rights do not
belong in Muslim societies. I have singled John Strawson
out for particular attention, because he has been most
assiduous in purveying gross mischaracterizations of my
work in one publication after another, all the while
maintaining the pretense of being engaged in scholarship. I
propose here to account for John Strawson’s bizarre
“reading” by assuming that he owes an intellectual debt to
Lewis Carroll, although one might well suspect that other
motives are at play. Strawson’s criticisms seem animated by
the Mock Turtle’s version of Arithmetic – “Ambition,
Distraction, Uglification and Derision.” I have already
published one short response to some of Strawson’s
outlandish charges.17 Although I can only respond here to a
fraction of his strange accusations, I hope that, once
alerted to Strawson’s tactics, readers will be prepared to
17
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dissect other dimensions of his oeuvre and to enjoy his
faux-scholarly “critiques” in the manifestly unserious
spirit in which they were written. By grasping the
patterns in Strawson’s misrepresentations, they will also
be prepared to identify the spam-like disinformation being
purveyed by other authors sharing the same mindset.
Strawson, operating in his through-the-looking-glass
mode, pretends that my Islam and Human Rights book has a
thesis that is diametrically opposed to the one that it
actually puts forth, writing: “Mayer concludes her book
with an explanation of her thesis that Islam contains a
‘culture based resistance to rights.’”18 Readers should
contrast Strawson’s fabrication with the book’s actual
conclusion, emphasizing that, despite the regular recourse
to Islam as a cover, political factors – not culture – lie
behind state-sponsored Islamic human rights schemes. I
stress that Islam and its associated culture are not the
problem:
Their Islamic pedigrees are dubious . . .the pattern of
diluted rights in the Islamic human rights schemes examined
here should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam
or its inherent incompatibility with human rights.
Instead, these diluted rights should be seen as part of a
broader phenomenon of attempts by elites -- the
beneficiaries of undemocratic and hierarchical systems -to legitimize their opposition to human rights by appealing
to supposedly distinctive cultural traditions.19
In John Strawson’s gross misrepresentation of my conclusion
one sees his “method” for composing a “critique” in a
nutshell: Deliberately ignore what another scholar has
written, invent obnoxious or ignorant stances that conflict
with the points of view actually expressed, falsely
attribute these stances to the scholar, and then proceed to
18
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“critique” the scholar for the false imputations. One also
sees the characteristics that mark his “critiques” as
exercises in pseudo-scholarship. Rather than confess that
he is engaged in a polemical endeavor, Strawson includes
some quotations, offers some footnotes, and writes in the
tone of an academic perturbed by the deficiencies that he
pretends that he has discovered. John Strawson’s scholarly
masquerade is one reason why a riposte is called for;
unwary readers, particularly unwary students, could be
deceived into thinking that there actually are factual
bases for his Mock Turtle-style disquisitions on my human
rights publications.
Being disinclined to consider the importance of
political dynamics within Muslim countries, John Strawson
acts mystified by analyses that focus on these dynamics.
Unwilling to examine the political motives and objectives
lurking behind oppressive regimes’ appeals to Islam to
justify policies violative of rights, he harps on a binary
world in which a beleaguered monolithic “Islam” faces off
against an arrogant, secular “West.” Imagining that this is
a struggle in which an external force, the West, deploys
human rights in a strategy for cultural domination,
Strawson’s outlook closely resembles that of the famous
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington – whom Strawson in
a Lewis Carroll-ish twist renames “Patrick P. Huntington.”20
In his “clash of civilizations” essay, Huntington claimed
that the West engenders conflicts by inappropriately
pressing “Western” human rights on resisting Muslims, who
find them culturally alien. John Strawson shares the
Huntingtonian perspective but adds a conspiratorial
dimension, treating calls for respecting international
human rights law as part of a Western plot against Islamic
culture. Thus, if I use international human rights law in
critical assessments of how Islam has been deployed as a
pretext for denying human rights, I am, in Strawson’s view,
serving as an agent for a pernicious Western campaign to
undermine Islamic culture.
John Strawson insists on a Huntingtonian East-West
split on human rights -- as if the International Bill of
Human Rights were a product of “the West,” when in reality
the historical record amply demonstrates that many Muslim
countries -- as well as other non-Western countries -played vital roles in the difficult work of shaping human
20
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rights principles.21 The major Western countries like the
United States largely remained on the sidelines -- when not
impeding the process of drafting the International Bill of
Human Rights. Far from sharing Huntington’s views, I object
to Huntington’s thesis so strongly that I was prompted to
write a ninety-seven page article debunking it,22 an article
that innumerable Muslims have told me that they have
appreciated as a corrective to Western preconceptions about
human rights being distinctively Western and about Islamic
culture being inherently opposed to human rights.
In his determined campaign to portray me as a person
infected with bigotry and anti-Islamic animus, John
Strawson insistently presses a polemic based on the notion
that I am deeply prejudiced against Islamic law and
dedicated to proving the superiority of Western law. In a
passage replete with grave accusations that he does not
even attempt to substantiate, Strawson accuses me of
representing Islamic law as “an essentially defective legal
system,” “incomplete and inadequate.” He also pretends that
I am claiming that European law is “superior,”
”legitimate,” ”fully developed,” “a complete, established
and definite legal system”23 – ideas that run directly
counter to what I have written and taught over several
decades. He goes even further, asserting: “Her entire
standpoint is ‘western (sic) superiority.’”24 He does not –
and cannot -- offer one shred of evidence buttressing his
outlandish assertions.
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Not only am I free of the ugly Western triumphalism
that John Strawson glibly and falsely imputes to me, but,
not sharing Strawson’s binary vision, I do not use the
kinds of stereotypes about “the West” and “Islam” or about
“European law” and “Islamic law” that one finds in
Strawson’s own work. Although in the course of longer
discussions, I have as a matter of convenience often been
obliged to resort to short hand terms like “the West,”
“Islam,” or “the Muslim world,” any reader who peruses my
arguments will see that I consistently stress that one
cannot fairly generalize about “Islamic law,” which has
always encompassed complex and diverse strands and which
presently also morphs into many national variants – as well
as variants reflecting numerous competing trends in
contemporary Islamic thought. In contrast, John Strawson
often writes of two simple entities that might be compared
with a view to establishing that one of the two were
superior. Then, in a tactic that belongs at the Mad Tea
Party, Strawson ascribes to me what are his stereotypes
about “the West” and “Islam” as an oppositional pair and
pretends that I use his stereotypes – stereotypes that I
despise -- to establish the inferiority of Islam!
Far from adopting European/Western law as a standard
of perfection, I use international human rights law as my
standard – a law in which inputs from Muslim delegates were
significant and a law that the United States has largely
refused to accept. Furthermore, I condemn laws and policies
that fail to conform to international human rights law,
regardless of whether these come from governments in
Africa, Asia, or the Americas. For example, I have
lectured extensively about U.S. non-acceptance of
international human rights law, I have critically assessed
the Vatican’s and the U.S. government’s stances on
international human rights, and I have contributed to
critiques of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices.
Alas, the stark distortions that John Strawson purveys
feed common misconceptions about human rights being
inherently “Western” and also suit the designs of those who
appeal to Islam as the means to defend Muslim countries
from charges of perpetrating massive human rights
violations. People are ready to accept at face value claims
that confirm their stereotypes. The intellectual pollution
caused by Stawson’s pseudo-scholarship, which pretends to
dissect my publications while actually resorting to
egregious misrepresentations, is, apparently, spreading.

An ambition recent book on human rights and Islamic
law by Mashood A. Baderin reveals the imprint of Strawson’s
distortions. Although his work is far better researched
than Strawson’s and is generally more respectful of the
canons of scholarship, Baderin does resort to similar
tactics to “prove” his contentions that supporting human
rights universalism is simply a facet of Western cultural
imperialism.25 In advancing his theme that calling for
Muslims to enjoy the full human rights guaranteed under
international law means imposing Western cultural values on
resisting Muslims, Baderin explicitly cites Strawson’s
views.26 Apparently influenced by Strawson, Baderin imagines
that, when I talk about the need for universalism in the
human rights domain, I am arguing that, in his words,
“Western culture should serve as the universal normative
model for the content of international human rights law,”27
a glaring misrepresentation that is later repeated.28
Following Strawson’s model of taking words out of context
and then twisting them to “prove” a point, Baderin offers a
mangled and misleading “quotation” from my Islam and human
rights book to support the false insinuation I posit that
“universalism” entails agreeing that “Islamic law has no
normative value and enjoys little prestige.”29 In the
actual text, when using the language last quoted, I am not
positioning Islamic law vis-a-vis “universalism” but
speaking of writings of specialists on international law,
who work within the framework of “the Western legal
heritage, within which Islamic law has no normative value
and enjoys little prestige.”30 The actual passage deals with
my characterization of the parochialism of the Western
scholarly tradition; it is not presented as my own opinion,
nor do I endorse it. Thus, one can see that Baderin –
presumably inspired by Strawson’s “critique” – ignores what
I have actually written in his efforts to establish that,
when I treat the human rights provisions in international
law as authoritative, this must be the same as denigrating
Islam and demanding that Muslim countries defer to the
alien Western tradition.
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Significantly, in addition to replicating aspects of
on Strawson’s “critique,” Baderin exhibits a philosophy
regarding rules of Islamic dress that resembles that of
Anouar Majid, not conceding that women should have any
choice in deciding what Islamic modesty requirements
entail. According to Baderin, Muslim women have only two
options: they may choose either to be completely covered
(as in the model of the Afghan burqa or Saudi abaya) or to
conform to the Iranian style of hejab, which allows them to
uncover their faces, hands, and feet while concealing
everything else.31 Like Majid, he seems unconcerned by the
reality that such restrictions on women’s dress are
coercively imposed by states or vigilantes against the
wishes of many of the affected women. One can infer that a
person who demands that Muslim women defer to his notions
of correct Islamic dress would have reason to want to
delegitimize Muslim women’s aspirations to enjoy the
protections that international law would afford them. One
could also presume that he would want to discredit the
attitudes of a Muslim woman like Shirin Ebadi. who is a
staunch supporter of international human rights law and
sees it as protecting Muslim women’s right to veil or not
to veil, whether in Europe or in Muslim countries. In these
connections, one of the easiest gambits would be to
announce that international human rights law is “too
Western” for use in Muslim milieus and that Muslim women
who demand that their rights be protected according to
universal standards are cultural traitors whose opinions
can be disregarded.
In connection with Strawson’s charges that I am
insisting on the superiority of Western law, in an
assertion that Strawson probably imagined would be
blistering, he trumpets: “France, the home of the
Enlightenment, did not grant women the right to vote until
after the Second World War.”32 Apparently, John Strawson
hopes to convey to readers the idea that I would never have
realized that the situation of women’s rights in France has
even been anything but optimal! However, in reality, I
have written an article demonstrating how some
discriminatory rules that are too casually associated with
Islam have exact counterparts in French laws, at least as
these stood until very recently. I have explained that
North African countries are really not far behind France in
the pace at which their family laws are evolving. I have
31
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also pointed out how, in borrowing Swiss law in the 1920s,
Turkey adopted a Western law with some of the same
patriarchal features that are found in Islamic law. Far
from singling out Islamic law as a special barrier to
women’s rights, I have demonstrated how closely related are
the patterns in legal developments relating to women’s
rights issues on both sides of the Mediterranean. I have
also suggested that, when looking at aspects of women’s
rights around the Mediterranean, we might dispense
altogether with the category of “Islamic law,” employing a
different category, “Mediterranean law.”33
Moreover, I have argued that, in discussing the
current transitional phase in the evolution of legal
systems in Muslim countries, we should adopt the Italian
comparativist Ugo Mattei’s classifications of the three
historical stages that all legal systems pass through –
precisely because I see strong parallels between this
transitional phase and the stages of development that
European systems have passed through.34 Now, why would I be
pointing out the striking similarities between patterns in
legal evolution in European and Muslim countries if I
espoused the prejudiced stereotypes that Strawson imputes
to me or if I believed in “othering” Islamic law?
Demonstrating more parallel developments, I have
discussed the striking similarities in the resistance to
women’s international human rights on the part of various
Muslim countries, the Vatican, and the United States, all
of which have had difficulties absorbing the principle of
women’s equality in the Women’s Convention. My critical
analysis of how closely related the supposedly “Islamic”
and “Catholic” positions are and how they, in turn, closely
correlate with the U.S. Government’s stance resisting
33
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women’s equality, has won an appreciative audience in the
Arab world, where it has been republished in both English
and in Arabic.35 I have also specifically compared the U.S.
deployment of constitutional pretexts for refusing to
adhere to women’s international human rights to Muslim
countries’ use of Islam in the same connection,
demonstrating the analogies in the strategies involved.36
Why would I be writing about how Muslim countries, the
Vatican, and the United States have taken closely related
stances in resisting women’s international human rights if
I believed in Western superiority and the inferiority of
Islamic law?
I have shown how the Saudi prohibition on women
driving cars was foreshadowed by events in the United
States at the dawn of the automobile era. I have reminded
readers that research shows that, so threatening was
women’s automobility to the U.S. status quo in the early
twentieth century, that men strongly resisted allowing
women to drive, offering a variety of rationales for why
women did not belong behind the wheel.37 That is, I have
tried to help Western readers understand that they need to
look beyond “Islam” when analyzing a problem like why the
Saudi government bars women from driving, demonstrating
that in situations where the use of cars by women threatens
to undermine male control – whether it be in the United
States or in Saudi Arabia, rationalizations are devised for
keeping the privilege of driving for men. If I am
encouraging people to appreciate that, regardless of what
35
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the Saudi Minister of the Interior may say, it is
simplistic to assert that “Islam” bars Saudi women from
taking the wheel, is it reasonable to accuse me of
portraying Islam as defective?
I am as critical of the rationales that U.S.
officialdom offers for non-compliance with human rights as
I am of the Saudi rationale for barring women from driving.
For example, in the course of a tough assessment of how and
why the United States has used its Constitution as a
pretext for non-compliance with international human rights
law, I have pointed out how a worshipful attitude towards
antiquated constitutional doctrines has been a factor
leading to the United States lagging behind the standards
of international human rights law.38 Why would I be
discussing U.S. backwardness in assimilating international
human rights if I were trying to present Western law as
being “superior” and “fully developed,” as John Strawson
charges?
One of John Strawson’s favorite gambits is critiqueby-epithet, and he hurls epithets with casual abandon.
According to him, I am, among other things, a “positivist.”
Now, in the legal domain, people use “positivist” in a
variety of senses, so it would behoove someone who
apparently thinks that positivism is a very bad thing to
explain precisely how and why it applies to a given
author’s work. However, offering clear explanations is not
Strawson’s style, so one is left to speculate why he would
paste the “positivist” label on a scholar like myself who
highlights how political interests shape what is presented
as “law.” I shall not lose any sleep worrying about what
basis Strawson might fancy that he has for this accusation,
because he so regularly attacks me as if I had written
precisely the opposite of what I have written. Thus, given
Strawson’s proclivities, it is fair to assume that his
accusations that I am a positivist reflect the reality that
I am not a positivist, which puts one in mind of Lewis
Carroll’s king, who says: “If there's no meaning in it . .
. that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't
try to find any.”
However, there is another aspect to glib accusations
of “positivism.” Over the years I have witnessed a pattern
on the part of persons eager to jumpstart their careers who
fling about denunciations of “positivist” scholarship. In
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this context, “positivist” scholarship often turns out to
be scholarship that is fully documented and extensively
researched. As far as I can tell, blasting “positivism”
serves the goal for many “anti-positivists” of implicitly
downgrading the importance of accuracy and a solid research
basis, thereby rehabilitating (at least in their own eyes)
the quality of their own writings. If scholars who take
pains trying to make their assessments well-grounded and
accurate can be dismissed as “positivists,” so the
accusers’ attenuated logic would seem to run, then they
themselves cannot be faulted for making careless and
inaccurate allegations. In this “anti-positivist” schema,
making unresearched counterfactual assertions can be
elevated to a virtue.
If one is committed to operating in an “antipositivist” mode, why not be “creative” about changing
important historical dates? No slouch in this regard, John
Strawson coins a new, imaginary date for the 1979 postrevolutionary Iranian Constitution, which he dates to
1980.39 In a perfect illustration of the level of John
Strawson’s qualifications, not only does he give readers
the wrong date, but he attacks me in the associated
footnote, asserting “Mayer refers to the Constitution that
emerged after the Islamic Revolution as dated 1979, in fact
it was adopted in May 1980.”40 This example embodies
Strawson’s “anti-positivist” attempt to lure unwary readers
into his through-the-looking-glass world. I did not invent
the 1979 date; there is ample evidence in the historical
record supporting it.41 In another instance of “antipositivism,” John Strawson boldly makes up out of whole
cloth a new – and false -- date for the 1993 Vienna Human
Rights Conference; Strawson moves in back one year to
1992.42
In another example of his “anti-positivist” modus
operandi, John Strawson pretends that I harbor the illusion
39
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that I can channel a late Pakistani Islamist! He maintains
that I have had the astounding presumption when discussing
Tabandeh and Mawdudi, two figures prominent in the reaction
against human rights, to assert that I can be “certain that
what the former (the more conservative of the two), said in
print was what Mawdudi really thought, but for political
reasons would not write.”43(emphasis added) In reality, on
the page that Strawson refers to, one can see that, far
from presuming that I possess the psychic capacity to
intuit what were Mawdudi’s unwritten ideas, I am expressly
relying on texts -- Mawdudi’s own publications, which are
cited with references to the relevant pages.44 Thus, far
from claiming that these are positions that Mawdudi “for
political reasons would not write,”(emphasis added) I am
steering readers to textual sources, where they can find
what Mawdudi did write. And, no, I do not indicate that
Mawdudi adheres to the same positions as Tabandeh; I make a
more nuanced assertion, noting that his positions “are
similar to Tabandeh’s, with the exception that Mawdudi
believed that women should be able to sue for divorce on
liberal grounds.”45 That is, far from saying that what
Tabandeh said “was what Mawdudi really thought” as John
Strawson alleges, I highlight an important area where,
based on consulting texts, I have noted that the two
differ. Reading John Strawson’s far fetched assertions, one
recalls a line from Lewis Carroll: “Contrariwise,"
continued Tweedledee, "if it was so, it might be, and if it
were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's
logic!"
In a further “anti-postivist” gambit, John Strawson
attacks me for insisting on my version of Islam: “Mayer
still seems dissatisfied that the texts that she chose do
not measure up to her Islam, and therefore she imputes even
more conservative meanings to them.”46(emphasis added) My
Islam? Apparently, Strawson wants to convince readers that,
although a non-Muslim, I take positions on Muslims’
doctrinal quarrels! In reality, I consistently position
myself as an outsider observing inter-Islamic disputes
about law and doctrine. I have repeatedly refused
invitations to write and speak about Islam in any normative
or prescriptive sense, my position being that Muslims alone
should do this. If there is something to which I do refer
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as normative is definitely not any religion; it is
international human rights law. I have never tried to
conceal that I support international human rights law or
that I am gratified to see religious thought -- and not
only Islamic thought -- evolving in directions that bring
religious teachings and human rights into harmonious
coexistence. However, my admitted sympathies for
progressive interpretations of religious traditions,
including Islam, is not the same thing as my presuming that
I should or could impose my opinions on persons of other
faiths wrestling with their doctrinal disputes!
It is especially ironic to have John Strawson
complaining about my deploying what is supposedly my
version of Islam when in Strawson’s work he keeps pressing
a version of Islam that one might fairly call “Strawson’s
Islam.” Strawson seems to have drunk deeply from the well
of Islamist cliches and to have absorbed typical
stereotypes that one finds in Islamist tracts. He implies
that there is one Islamic outlook that leads to Muslims all
thinking that they must be governed by their religious law,
because for Muslims secular systems are unnatural. “From
the Islamic standpoint, Islamic law is a system of
regulation that . . . is itself created by God . . .As a
consequence, within the Islamic outlook, it is difficult to
conceive of a secular state or a secular legal
system.”47(emphasis added) Strawson could potentially
correct his stereotypes about Muslims having difficulty
conceiving of a secular state or legal system by consulting
the thoughtful analyses of secularism and Islam offered by
Sami Zubaida.48 But, actually learning about the secular
dimensions of the Islamic heritage would be the concern of
a scholar, not a task for a polemicist seeking to spin a
particular line.
Endorsing “the Islamic outlook,” John Strawson reveals
that he shares Islamists’ bitterness over the displacement
of Islamic law by Western law, which he sees as being
imposed on unwilling Muslims by hostile Western forces
determined to undermine Islamic culture. His
misconceptions about earlier legal history tie on with his
mistaken belief that demands for respect for the human
47
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rights developed under U.N. auspices entail imposing a
“Western” law inimical to Islamic culture. Embracing
typical Islamist views, he seems to think that Islamic law
constitutes a viable system suitable for immediate
implementation in contemporary Muslim countries -- –
despite the fact that it in almost all countries Islamic
law has fallen into desuetude. He fails to consider that,
having long been in abeyance, Islamic law has not been
comprehensively streamlined and updated and has not been
expanded to cover numerous new areas of law that have
emerged in the last century. Arduous work would have be
invested to rework the Islamic legal corpus in order to
distill from the enormously complex sources and
jurisprudence of the past the foundations for a viable
modern legal system. Even Saudi Arabia has in recent years
had to adjust to a vastly expanded role for secular
regulation, finding insufficient guidance in Islamic law
for the many new issues that are coming up.
John Strawson seems to believe that Iran’s
Islamization program has already proven his thesis that
Islamic law can easily be picked up and applied in all
areas without further ado. He quotes with approval Chibli
Mallat’s encomium to “the success and durability of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran.”49 Strawson’s warm enthusiasm
for Iranian Islamists’ project of reimposing Islamic law is
suggestive of an ideological rigidity that precludes taking
into account Iranians’ overwhelmingly negative reactions to
having to endure rule by a corrupt and oppressive
theocratic clique.50
John Strawson discounts Iranians’ alienation from the
official Islamic system and their mounting demands for
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secularization. The clamor for secularization is
particularly strong where human rights are concerned.51
This clamor has grown so loud that, in an effort to cater
to the surge in pro-secular sentiment, the ambitious former
President Hashemi-Rafsanjani (himself a cleric) in January
2005 publicly tried to win popularity by recasting Iran’s
system as a basically secular democratic one.52 Strawson
also apparently assumes that Iran’s “success” in
Islamization went much further than it actually did. The
fact that a clique of clerical hardliners holds the reins
of power in the wake of the Islamic Revolution is
politically significant, but it has not led to Iran’s
repudiation of the French foundations of the legal order.
As those who know the Iranian situation can attest, the
secular foundations of the Shah’s legal and governmental
system remain, although these are obscured by superimposed
elements of the official ideology like the rule by the
faqih and clerical domination of crucial institutions and
the incorporation of elements from the medieval Islamic
heritage like penalties of stoning and amputations, and
floggings of women not wearing proper Islamic dress.
Iran’s heritage of French law has recently been
augmented by new laws enacted by the Majles, most of which
have no derivation from Islam – a fact that is publicly
acknowledged even by Iran’s ruling clerics.53 With
perceptions shaped by Islamist literature, John Strawson is
ill-prepared to accept this; he, after all, insists that
Islamic law offers comprehensive coverage, addressing “all
areas of social regulation, in Western categories, from
criminal law to family law, from constitutional law to
public international law.”54 It is high time for Strawson
to redirect his pique and to start scolding Iran’s
theocratic leaders for failing by such a wide margin to
rely on Islamic law, which he knows suffices for all their
needs, even though Iranians – including Iran’s ruling
clerics -- have concluded that it does not.
Mired in rigid preconceptions about a gulf separating
“the West” and “Islam,” John Strawson is impeded from
recognizing that the hybrid legal system that antedated the
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Islamic revolution continues. (This hybridity is typical
of contemporary Middle Eastern legal systems where official
Islamization has been undertaken.) Iran’s approach to human
rights, in which the regime’s “Islamic” restrictions are
superimposed on borrowed human rights principles, is a
quintessential model of such hybridization -- an unstable
compromise between secular law and what hardline clerics
would say are mandatory Islamic norms curbing rights and
freedoms.
Presumably, John Strawson’s refusal to acknowledge
this hybridity – a real world fact that is hard to
reconcile with his belief in “the success” of the Islamic
revolution -- is a factor impeding him from following my
discussions of Islamic human rights schemes and prompting
him to imagine that my criticisms of Iran’s “Islamic” human
rights formulations amount to attacks on Islam per se.
Those familiar with Strawson’s “anti-positivist” style will
not be surprised to see that, after insisting on the
polarity of the West and “Islam” and after displaying a
lack of awareness of the significance of hybridity for
“Islamic” human rights formulations, Strawson laments that
Western scholars are guilty of underestimating the
hybridity of legal cultures55 – as if he himself were not a
prime culprit in this regard.
John Strawson’s idiosyncratic vision of Middle Eastern
legal history plays a part in his mischaracterization of my
work on human rights and his insistence that it serves an
Orientalist/Imperialist agenda. Thus, one needs to examine
Strawson’s preconceptions about legal history. What does
Strawson imagine caused Western law to be adopted?
Islamists routinely blame European Imperialism for this,
and Strawson follows their line.56 More specifically,
Strawson blames a sinister Anglo-American axis for the
decline of Islamic power and the displacement of Islamic
law. (Presumably, he imagines that I am tied to this
sinister axis.) He opines: “A critical consequence of the
Anglo-American construction of Islamic law is the
destruction of the legitimacy of Islamic power within
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Islamic society and within the wider world . . . Islamic
principles are replaced with European ones.”57
Many unanswered questions are prompted by this claim,
which seems to reflect an ethnocentric perspective, one
that places the British legal system at the center of the
legal universe. John Strawson cannot, of course, reconcile
his claim that the “destruction of the legitimacy of
Islamic power” occurred via the “Anglo-American
construction of Islamic law” with the reality that few
Muslim countries have any links to the Anglo-American
tradition. True -- certain Muslim countries such as
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Sudan were colonized by
Britain long enough for the common law to take root, but
most Muslim countries have been oriented towards the
overwhelmingly dominant model of Continental European law.
If “the Anglo-American construction of Islamic law” had had
the portentous impact that John Strawson ascribes to it,
why and how did it lead to the replacement of Islamic law
by laws alien to the Anglo-American world, like the
codified laws of countries such as France, Germany, Italy,
and Switzerland?
In his lectures on websites about legal history, John
Strawson completely ignores a global phenomenon -- that
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a
near-universal consensus among the countries of the world
that codified Continental European law was the most
efficient and appropriate system for use by the modern
nation-state, with the countries forcibly colonized by
Britain long enough for the common law system to take root
remaining the exceptions. Contrary to the way that Strawson
prefers to depict developments, although European
colonization was one means of transplanting laws, European
domination was not essential when the merits of codified
Continental European law were so obvious. Thus, for
example, Japan, a country never colonized and certainly not
under Teutonic domination, decided in the nineteenth
century to adopt German law. Far from being overwhelmed by
Strawson’s imaginary Anglo-American juggernaut, governments
in the Middle East were often independently engaged in the
process of legal reform and, like Japan, preferred
borrowing Continental European codes. After evaluating the
modern civil law and its archaic Anglo-American
counterpart, these governments dismissed the latter as
distinctly inferior and unworthy of emulation.
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In this connection John Strawson presents what is
meant to be an historical account of Egyptian law in the
nineteenth century, concentrating on the deprecatory
attitudes of the British towards Islamic law and Islamic
courts, as if the negative attitudes of British
Imperialists would have been the determining factor in
displacing Islamic law in Egypt.58 From Strawson’s account,
a reader with no knowledge of Egyptian legal history would
assume that Egypt under British Occupation must have been
forced to adopt British law. But what does history tell us
actually happened?
In a crucial development – one ignored by John
Strawson -- members of the Egyptian elite, during the
period when Egypt was still independent and prior to the
British Occupation, adopted French law in many areas, a law
that Egyptians refused to abandon during the decades of the
British Occupation despite pressures from the British
colonial authorities, who wanted them to adopt British law.
As Nathan Brown accurately observes in his assessment of
how Egypt’s rulers unsentimentally discarded most of
Islamic law in the nineteenth century, they replaced
Islamic law by French law because the latter was better
suited to their objectives. “What attracted such elites was
not the Western nature of the legal systems they
constructed but the increased control, centralization and
penetration they offered.”59 The actual story of Egyptians
choosing to import French law on their own and scorning
British appeals to adopt the common law does not fit within
Strawson’s preconceptions, according to which Muslim
societies are passive victims of encroaching
Westernization, as helpless as the hapless Dormouse at the
Mad Tea Party.
Given the active role played by governmental elites in
Middle Eastern countries in transplanting Continental
European laws, it is bizarre to blame Westerners and their
smug belief in the superiority of Western law for the
desuetude into which Islamic law has fallen. John Strawson
should redirect his energy to convincing governments of
Middle Eastern countries that they need to follow Islamic
law and that it was a terrible mistake to borrow
Continental European law and/or to retain their Westernized
legal systems after achieving independence. These
governments, after all, are the decision-makers in this
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regard, not the proponents of his “Anglo-American
construction” or the Western Colonialist/Orientalist
scholarly cabal to which Strawson attributes such decisive
impact.
Refusing to acknowledge this reality and rejecting the
possibility that internal political dynamics could lead
Muslim countries to abandon Islamic law, John Strawson
lectures that: “Even within the Islamic world, by the time
Kemal Attaturk(sic) came to power, the West had won the
legal argument, Islamic law was backward and European law
modern. The establishment of a secular republic in Turkey,
and with it the abolition of the Caliphate, was a logical
result of the pressure of the West on Islamic culture.”60 In
this comment, Strawson reveals how his thinking flows in
the Islamist groove, Islamists being inclined to
romanticize the last Ottoman rulers as being stalwart
defenders of the independence of Muslim societies against
Western inroads. Refusing to consider the actual historical
background of Ataturk’s reforms, Strawson presses the idea
that the only relevant factors in the secularization of the
laws in Muslim countries could be external Western
pressures aimed at destroying “Islamic culture,” a culture
that he imagines would flourish if only these external
Western pressures would cease.
One notes how John Strawson converts Mustafa Kemal’s
honorific title “Ataturk” into “Attaturk,” thereby changing
“father Turk” into “(nonsense word) Turk.” (This kind of
misspelling of “Ataturk” is extremely common among English
speakers who read little about Turkey.) In Strawson’s case,
it seems that he has paid as little attention to crucial
elements in Ataturk’s biography as he has to his name. In
1911 Ataturk had been sent to Libya where he sought to
organize Libyan Muslims to fight for the Sultan against the
invading Italians – finding scant support for the Ottoman
cause. Near the end of World War I he was stationed on the
southern front, where the Turks were forced to retreat by
the advance of the combined forces of the British and the
Arabs, who were fighting a jihad -- a jihad, be it noted,
that was being waged by Arab Muslims against Turkish
Muslims and against the Ottoman Sultan. Not surprisingly,
Ataturk was unimpressed by romantic notions of pan-Islamic
solidarity!
Besides, in the aftermath of the war, the Ottoman
Sultan, with support from many in the religious
establishment, turned out to be a willing tool of European
60
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powers, which were bent on carving up Turkey and putting
the straits under European control. Infuriated by
Ataturk’s spearheading the nationalist resistance to this
plan, the Sultan proclaimed that killing the nationalists
was a religious duty, and the highest Ottoman religious
authority called for killing Ataturk. Not surprisingly, the
Turkish nationalists drew the conclusion that these old
Ottoman institutions were inimical to the cause of Turkish
independence. After the 1923 nationalist triumph in driving
out the invading Europeans and establishing favorable peace
terms, which included ending the humiliating regime of
capitulations that had signaled European superiority,
Ataturk devoted himself to reforms designed to strengthen
Turkey. The days of the Caliphate were numbered – and not
because of “the pressure of the West on Islamic culture,”
as those who follow the Islamist line would have it, but
because of the Caliphate’s demonstrated willingness to ally
itself with the European invaders, a rank betrayal of the
Turkish nationalist cause.
The year 1926 saw the Turkish importation of the Swiss
Civil Code. Contrary to what John Strawson imagines, this
was not a result of external pressures from European
powers, but was an initiative undertaken by Turkey’s young,
Swiss-educated Minister of Justice, who had been impressed
during his studies in Switzerland by Swiss democracy and
who found it desirable to borrow a codified law for which
the needed commentaries had been already worked out.61 If
Strawson’s students take seriously his admonition that
Turkish secularization had to come about as the result of
the “pressure of the West on Islamic culture,” they must
imagine that hordes of fierce Swiss mercenaries imbued with
an anti-Islamic animus encircled Ankara at a vulnerable
moment and forced the personage whom Strawson calls
“(nonsense word) Turk” to defer to the standards in use in
Geneva and Zurich.
That the only radical, complete secularization
undertaken in an independent Muslim country occurred in
Turkey after the Turkish nationalists had triumphed,
achieving one of the rare, ringing military defeats that
Muslims have been able to inflict on predatory European
forces in recent centuries, handily disproves John
Strawson’s thesis that Muslims’ abandonment of Islamic law
and borrowing of Western law occur as a result of Muslim
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weakness and Western domination. But, the actual history of
Turkey’s adoption of European civil law is not the kind of
thing that would deter a person with Strawson’s mindset
from portraying this development as a consequence of
Turkey’s will to stand by Islamic law being overborne by
pressures from Western Imperialism, especially of the
Anglo-Saxon kind.
John Strawson’s misapprehensions about how Turkey’s
secularization occurred are linked to his misperceptions of
how international human rights law relates to problems in
Muslim societies. To his way of thinking, the Swiss Civil
Code adopted under Ataturk could only be an alien
imposition, and so is international law – including
international human rights law. He cancels out the agency
of people within Muslim societies and discounts the
possibility that Muslims might choose to resort to European
codes or international law after concluding that these
provide useful solutions to the actual problems facing
their societies.
John Strawson cannot conceive of a situation where
Muslims would assess their needs in starkly practical
terms, deciding that protections for their human rights
were needed and concluding that international human rights
law was well designed to curb prevailing abuses -- like
tyrannical governments, rampant discrimination, draconian
censorship, arbitrary and politicized justice, and cruel
and inhuman treatment of detainees. Just as Swiss law could
only come into Turkey as a result of Western pressures, so,
according to Strawson’s imaginings, international human
rights law could only come into Muslim societies as a
result of Western threats and predations.
Like the scholar whom he calls “Patrick P.
Huntington,” John Strawson associates calls for human
rights, democracy, and pluralism with outsiders, not
conceding the fact that they also are voiced – often
urgently – by denizens of Muslim societies. Strawson
maintains that those who call for “human rights, democracy,
and pluralism” are carrying out a new version of the old
the colonialist project.62 Now, as applied to President
George W. Bush and his circle, Strawson’s charge that
expressed concern for human rights, democracy, and
pluralism should be seen as linked to neocolonialism would
have merit. However, he can have no basis whatsoever for
associating me with the U.S. neo-conservatives who seek to
advance U.S. hegemonic designs under the rubric of
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advancing rights and freedoms. Among other things, I call
for universal respect for international law, a law that
applies as much to the United States as it does to other
countries, and, like other principles supporters of
international law, I deplore the way that the current Bush
administration cavalierly disregards and violates
international law.
In John Stawson’s view, Muslims should eschew the U.N.
system of international law as alien and should instead be
using their own international law. Not content with
accusing Western colonialism of displacing Islamic law
within Muslim countries, Strawson claims that Western power
also unfairly sidelined Islamic law in the international
arena. For example, he indignantly protests that ashShaybani’s treatise as-Siyar “contains detailed codes on
the Law of War”(sic) and that many of its “propositions on
the Law of War(sic), would not seem unfamiliar to the
modern student of international law.”63
The invocation of siyar brings on John Strawson’s
disquisition on what he calls “siyrat”(sic) -- a
particularly revealing example of his “anti-positivist”
methods.64 Now, readers should note that by “siyrat”(sic)
Strawson intends to refer to the Arabic noun sira, a
singular noun, which is siyar in the plural form. Strawson
identifies “siyrat”(sic) — his garbled version the Arabic
singular sira -- as being the plural of what Strawson
claims is a singular noun, siyar – in reality, the Arabic
plural.65 That is, Strawson misspells the singular noun sira
-- there being no word “siyrat” in Arabic -- and confuses
it with the plural form of the noun. Strawson also concocts
an “anti-positivist” way of deriving Arabic words,
asserting that siyar “comes from the plural siyrat(sic).”66
This derivation scheme is, of course, totally spurious.
Arabic words derive from their roots, the root in this case
being sara.
The concentrated disinformation contained in this
“lesson” that Strawson offers about the Arabic language
merits consideration. It should wave a red warning flag for
readers who might not otherwise be attuned to the Humpty63
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Dumpty-ish character of John Strawson’s lectures. This
nonsense is accompanied by a neat pseudo-scholarly twist;
in connection with his disquisition on siyar, Strawson
stresses his concern for accuracy lest he “convey the wrong
cultural metaphor and be construed as Orientalist.”67 Thus,
at the same time that, following the model of Lewis
Carroll’s Jabbewocky, he fancifully invents and twists
Arabic, he pretends to have a scholarly concern to respect
the canons of Arabic and thereby to avoid the dreaded
pitfalls of Orientalism.
As part of his complaints directed at the supposed
Western determination to sideline the Islamic version of
international law, John Strawson complains “Islamic law has
as much claim as any other system to be included.”68 Now,
those of us who examine developments in the real world
would point to an obvious problem in John Strawson’s claim
that it is Westerners who are to be blamed for sidelining
Islamic law: Islamic international law has long been
abandoned by Muslim countries. Even the members of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference have elected to
follow the U.N. system of international law in their
dealings with each other rather than to apply Islamic law.
If members of the OIC had found Islamic international law
adequate and appropriate for governing their interactions,
it would have been perfectly feasible for them to select
Islamic law as their governing law, just as European Union
countries have elected to be governed by European law. That
they have not done so is one indication that Islamic
international law is not viewed by Muslim governments as
being suited for use in contemporary circumstances. If
Strawson ever stepped outside his through-the-looking-glass
domain, he might also note that some of the rules devised
over one thousand years ago necessarily contain certain
features that are ill-suited for contemporary use -- not
only in the opinion of the “Orientalists,” but also in the
opinion of contemporary Muslim states.69 Instead of blaming
people in the West for imagining the unsuitability of
Islam’s version of international law, Strawson should
logically be directing his ire at OIC member countries,
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demanding that they cease and desist using conventional
international law and agree to be governed by Islamic law.
Because John Strawson is determined to situate me in
the company of Orientalists who would not recognize that
Islamic law could be of any relevance for international
disputes, he naturally refuses to acknowledge what I have
published in this area. In an example of his “antipositivism” run amok, Strawson charges that, due to my
“positivist methodology” I cannot understand that the ICJ
can refer to Islamic law.70 However, in reality I have
discussed how Islamic law was factored into the ICJ’s
analysis of the issues in the Western Sahara case, which
was decided in 1982. In the course of my discussion, I
demonstrated how Islamic law can provide decisional
guidelines for judges dealing with a contemporary
international case.71 With a blithe disregard for accuracy,
John Strawson chooses to write as if I had not discussed
how the ICJ has used Islamic law and perversely insists:
“For Mayer, Islamic law confronts the international legal
order. It is not part of it, it is the ‘other.’”72 Strawson
waxes indignant about “committed orientalists”(sic) who see
Islamic law “as conservative, aberrant and to be kept out
of power-defining relationships . . . as a defective legal
system,” and sniffs disdainfully: “Mayer continues this
methodology. . .”73
To establish that I am infected by misbegotten
Orientalist prejudices, John Strawson thinks it useful to
distort what I have said about Edward Said. It seems that
Strawson has no interest in researching Edward Said’s
belief in human rights universality, which resembles my
own. Strawson chooses instead to imagine that Said shares
his convictions that human rights universalism is a Western
colonialist project. He is not alone in refusing to admit
that Said was a human rights universalist. As Tony Judt,
Said’s distinguished colleague and friend, has rightly
observed, Said became “the idolized hero of a generation of
cultural relativists in universities” who went on to
denounce “Western Culture” as part of “career building
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exercises in ‘postcolonial’ obscurantism (‘writing the
other’).”74 In reality, as Judt points out, Said was imbued
with a “deeply felt humanistic impulse” and insisted that
human rights are not “cultural or grammatical things, and
when they are violated . . . they are as real as anything
we can encounter.”75
I could go on at much greater length in cataloguing the
way that John Strawson misrepresents the relationship
between Said’s positions and my own, but one illustration
will have to suffice. In this connection, Strawson resorts
to one of his more extreme “anti-positivist” claims,
pretending to have discovered that I am wrong about how
Said’s Orientalism pertains to legal issues. He warns
readers: “This also demonstrates that Mayer’s strictures
that Said’s Orientalism . . .is mainly confined to
‘anthropology and philosophy’ would seem to be erroneous.”76
In reality, I have never uttered the proposition that
Strawson attributes to me, never made the ludicrous claim
that Said’s book is mainly confined to anthropology and
philosophy. Instead, in a passage that John Strawson has
mischievously altered, I do assert that: “cultural
relativism . . . is a term that was developed for use in
anthropology and moral philosophy.”77(emphasis added) That
is, John Strawson substitutes “Said’s Orientalism” for the
original subject, “cultural relativism,” and then
pontificates that the passage as he has rewritten it “would
seem to be erroneous” – a flourish worthy of Humpty Dumpty
himself. In reacting to this nonsense, I might echo Lewis
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Carroll, characterizing John Strawson as being like Humpty
Dumpty, “sitting with his legs crossed, like a Turk, on the
top of a high wall.” This characterization makes no sense
– but, then, neither does Strawson’s vacuous “critique.”

Conclusion
What one sees in John Strawson’s work is an approach
that places him at the very opposite end of the scale from
what animates meaningful scholarship on human rights, like
Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously. As entertaining
as it might be to see pseudo-scholarship in some areas
carried out in the spirit of Lewis Carroll, when it comes
to the subject of human rights in the contemporary Middle
East, the issues are far too portentous for such tactics to
be acceptable – at least for those of us who do take human
rights seriously. Alas, publications that grossly
mischaracterize the secondary literature on this subject
are becoming all too typical. This means that, in order to
ensure that they do not become dupes of disinformation
campaigns, readers need to approach the relevant literature
with wariness. Undocumented claims need to be treated with
great skepticism, and claims that purport to rest on
documentation need to be cross-checked by consulting the
originals. But, this entails time-consuming efforts that
distract people from examining the actual human rights
problems in Muslim societies, problems that have in some
cases escalated to an even more acute crisis levels in the
wake of unilateralist interventions of the second Bush
Administration. For those of us who care about the human
rights problems afflicting contemporary Muslim societies –
many of which are now connected to U.S. neo-cons’ policies
of reshaping the Middle East, having to address and correct
the disinformation being deliberately disseminated by such
frivolous “critiques” rankles.
At a time when many Muslim societies are in agony, how
can we account for the dedication on the part of some
would-be “experts” on Islam and human rights to purveying
travesties of the secondary literature? At a time when
governments are oppressing and abusing people while
disseminating specious propaganda about their supposed
support for human rights, what explains the dedication of
people posing as scholars to putting forward “critiques”
designed not to elucidate human rights issues but to
obfuscate and mislead? One is drawn to troubling

speculations about the possible inducements that have
motivated people to produce such travesties, which cannot
possibly serve any constructive purpose.
I mentioned at the outset my preoccupation with the
suffering caused by human rights violations in Sudan; a
little lesson in human rights universalism taken from that
same unhappy country deserves to be mentioned in this
conclusion. When I went to Sudan over two decades ago, I
was appalled by the torments suffered by its inhabitants
under a brutal military dictatorship – one that was backed
by the United States. To my distress, although the names of
the military dictators have since changed, the miseries
inflicted on the Sudanese population have altered little in
the intervening years. The toll of deaths from the
devastating civil war, provoked by the Islamization program
launched in 1983, has in the interim mounted to at least
two million. So severe has the repression been that the
valiant Sudanese human rights activists whom I met in 198485 have since been forced to move to lives in exile.
Humanitarian crises in the eastern and western parts of
that country have also burgeoned. And, in the wake of
Sudanese moves to propitiate the United States, this
horribly misgoverned country is likely to again be included
in the list of U.S. friends in the region.
One of the great villains in the tale of the woes of
Sudan in this period is the prominent Islamist ideologue
Hassan al-Turabi, once a cheerleader for Nimeiri’s
reactionary and destructive Islamization program. Unable to
win power in free elections held in the brief period of
democracy after Nimeiri’s overthrow, Turabi gained a
dominant position after the 1989 coup by Omar Hassan alBashir, which replaced Sudan’s elected leaders by another
military dictatorship committed to Islamization.
Turabi and his party worked comfortably in a Sudanese
system where human rights violations were legion and
political repression was the norm.78 Turabi participated in
the cover up of rights violations. As Sudanese were
detained and savagely tortured in Sudan’s notorious “ghost
houses,” Turabi persisted in denials that serious abuses
were occurring.79 In 2001 after many years in which Turabi
seemed to be in control -- notwithstanding Bashir’s formal
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leadership, the two fell out, and Bashir established the
upper hand, arresting Turabi.
When allied with local dictatorships, Turabi showed
callous indifference to the sufferings of victims of rights
violations perpetrated by the Sudanese Government.
Where the Sudanese who were oppressed, imprisoned,
tortured, persecuted, and slaughtered in the course of
Turabi’s Islamization programs were concerned, he refused
to recognize the legitimacy of challenges to rights
violations based on the criteria of international human
rights law. As long as he was in the power elite and in a
position to press his ambitious Islamist agenda, Turabi’s
sole commitment was to amass the power to lead an
aggressive Islamization campaign. However, he discovered
the hard way what pervasive disregard for human rights and
democratic values can lead to. Turabi seems not to have
calculated that he might some day wind up on the losing end
of a power struggle among Sudanese Islamists. Once this
occurred, instead of continuing his previous line that
Islamization was all that mattered, he suddenly acted as if
Sudanese Muslims could legitimately make claims against
Bashir’s Islamist regime on the basis of the U.N. human
rights system, as if oppression in the cause of Islamism
were not above challenge.
Angry over his protracted detention, Turabi demanded to
have the protections of precisely those principles of
international human rights law that he and his Islamist
allies had shredded in the course of their campaign
forcibly to impose an Islamic system on the Sudan and to
crush all dissent. Turabi tacitly came around to the
proposition that Islamist regimes had to respect
international human rights standards, a position that at
least on its surface resembles that of the Sudanese human
rights activists who had been persecuted by Sudan’s
Islamist regimes since 1983. In hopes of winning
international backing for his claims that his human rights
had been violated and obtaining his release from detention
-- an extremely comfortable detention in comparison with
the terrible conditions in which Sudanese have typically
been held, Turabi’s defense committee appealed to
international organizations that employed international
human rights law to judge abuses.80 (One wonders if the
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coterie of foes of human rights universalism who have shown
themselves so eager to condemn Muslims who endorse the U.N.
system will ever decide that a prominent Islamist like
Turabi must likewise be denounced for appealing to
standards that they characterize as alien, Western, and
utterly unsuitable for use in Muslim societies!)
As much as I deplore his vile record, I concur that,
like all human beings, Turabi is entitled to the
protections of international human rights law.81 However,
it is a tragedy for his country that, when this influential
Islamist was a powerful figure on the Sudanese political
scene, he did not recognize that his fellow Sudanese
deserved to enjoy the same kinds of protections that he
would later invoke when his own interests were at stake.
When Turabi had been at or near the center of power, the
Sudanese Government had done all that it could to block
scrutiny of its human rights performance and had terrorized
Sudanese who attempted to report human rights violations to
U.N. observers.82
Had Turabi tried to convince his fellow Islamists that
it was essential to respect democratic freedoms and to
incorporate firm guarantees for human rights in their
program, his subsequent efforts to obtain for himself the
benefit of international human rights protections would not
seem so much a product of crass selfishness and gross
double standards. Given his track record, Sudanese had to
assume that Turabi actually did not have any belief that
human rights applied universally. They had reason worry
whether, if this ambitious Islamist again had the
opportunity, Turabi would try once more to impose a
ruthless Islamization agenda that would torpedo the
compromises envisaged under the tentative peace accords
reached in 2005 between North and South.
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Unlike Turabi, whose appeals to the U.N. human rights
system have been cynical and opportunistic, Shirin Ebadi,
Iran’s Nobel Laureate, has followed a coherent philosophy
of human rights universalism. In fighting to advance
respect for international human rights law in the dangerous
and oppressive Iranian environment, Ebadi has repeatedly
put her own life on the line to stand up for the human
rights of others. However, as already mentioned, she is
also ready to condemn Western violations, speaking out to
decry U.S. non-compliance. In her tough Nobel acceptance
speech she denounced the lack of respect for international
human rights law on the part of both Iran and the United
States. Among other things, she said:
The concerns of human rights advocates increase when they
observe that international human rights laws are breached
not only by their recognized opponents under the pretext of
cultural relativity, but that these principles are also
violated in Western democracies, in other words countries
which were themselves among the initial codifiers of the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. It is in this framework that, for months,
hundreds of individuals who were arrested in the course of
military conflicts have been imprisoned in Guantanamo,
without the benefit of the rights stipulated under the
international Geneva conventions, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the [United Nations] International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.83
Even more embarrassing for the second Bush Administration,
which tries to convince a skeptical world that its
interventionist policies in the Middle East are driven by
its altruistic devotion to human rights ideals, Ebadi
publicly denounced the projected U.S. attack on Iran as one
that would degrade rather than enhance Iranians’ rights.84
Her outspoken condemnations of U.S. policy show the wrong
headedness of charges that upholding the universality of
human rights necessarily correlates with backing for
Western plots to subjugate Muslims.
Reinforcing the logic of strong support for
universalism and underlining the fallacious nature of
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appeals to Islamic exceptionalism, a new book of haunting
images drawn by Sudanese torture victims depicting the
horrific abuses in the Bashir regime’s torture chambers has
appeared.85 For all who have seen the stomach-turning
photographs of the tortures inflicted on Iraqi prisoners in
Abu Ghraib and the drawings that detainees recently
released from Guantanamo have made of the abuses that they
were forced to endure, the similarities in the horrors
depicted will be striking. Whether carried out by the
minions of Sudan’s Islamist dictatorship or inflicted by
the U.S. military in prisons in Iraq and Cuba, these cruel
assaults on human dignity help us to appreciate how the
religious affiliations and nationalities of the
perpetrators and the victims count for nothing.
Another factor to consider as one considers the
judgments passed on U.S. mistreatment of detainees is how
credibility depends on the consistent use of human rights
standards. Human rights NGOs like Human Rights Watch that
follow policies of human rights universalism have the
ability to make credible critiques of the human rights
violations attendant on the U.S. “war” on terrorism.86
Conversely, parties like Turabi or Iran’s ruling theocrats,
who are not consistent in their own applications of human
rights standards, cannot expect their critiques to carry
any weight.
Like the authors of the UDHR, those of us who feel
genuine concern for the sufferings of our fellow humans
need to move from our revulsion at “barbarous acts which
have outraged the conscience of mankind” to upholding “a
common understanding” of the rights and freedoms needed to
protect human rights and the rule of law. And we need to
take the UDHR’s message of universality seriously.

85

See Coping with Torture: Images from the Sudan, Osman
Fadl and Ann M. Lesch, eds. (Trenton: The Red Sea Press,
2004).
86

See e.g., Human Rights Watch, Guantanamo: Detainee Accounts
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/

